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SUMMARY
Does increasing incomes improve health? In 1999, the UK government implemented minimum wage legislation, increasing
hourly wages to at least £3.60. This policy experiment created intervention and control groups that can be used to assess the
effects of increasing wages on health. Longitudinal data were taken from the British Household Panel Survey. We compared
the health effects of higher wages on recipients of the minimum wage with otherwise similar persons who were likely un-
affected because (1) their wages were between 100 and 110% of the eligibility threshold or (2) their ﬁrms did not increase
wages to meet the threshold. We assessed the probability of mental ill health using the 12-item General Health Question-
naire. We also assessed changes in smoking, blood pressure, as well as hearing ability (control condition). The intervention
group, whose wages rose above the minimum wage, experienced lower probability of mental ill health compared with both
control group 1 and control group 2. This improvement represents 0.37 of a standard deviation, comparable with the effect
of antidepressants (0.39 of a standard deviation) on depressive symptoms. The intervention group experienced no change in
blood pressure, hearing ability, or smoking. Increasing wages signiﬁcantly improves mental health by reducing ﬁnancial
strain in low-wage workers. © 2016 The Authors. Health Economics published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Does increasing income improve people’s health? The statistical association between poverty and worse health
outcomes is well-known, including self-reported health (Benzeval and Judge, 2001), access to healthcare
(Lorant et al., 2003), and mental ill health (Costello et al., 2003; Krieger et al., 1997). Moreover, whether or
to what extent these associations reﬂect a causal effect of income on health is unclear. A recent systematic re-
view of the impact of income changes on self-reported health found ‘mixed results and many… studies of poor
quality’ (Gunasekara et al., 2011), with marked heterogeneity across study types (Apouey and Clark, 2015),
contexts (Sacker et al., 2007), and sample populations (Frijters and Ulker, 2008). The health effects of increases
in income depend on how it is used, potentially not only to increase access to healthcare, leisure, or physical
activity, which may be health promoting (Marmot, 2002; McCarrier et al., 2011), but also to purchase alcohol
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(Bor et al., 2013), tobacco (Chaloupka et al., 2011), and unhealthy dietary products (Jensen and Miller, 2008;
Jetter and Cassady, 2006). Psychological well-being may be particularly susceptible to income changes, be-
cause poverty generates ﬁnancial strain, a known correlate of major depression (Taylor et al., 2011). Further,
the effect of income on health is likely to be non-linear, so that the effects on low-income groups may be greater
than those better off (Jones and Wildman, 2008; Leigh and Du, 2012; Mackenbach et al., 2005). Summarising
the state of the evidence, a recent review concludes that “a deﬁnite causal relationship between income and
health has…not yet been established” (Gunasekara et al., 2011).
Observational studies are limited by potential confounding factors. Often, these studies lack a well-speciﬁed coun-
terfactual for what would have occurred in the absence of an increase in income (if A had not occurred, then Bwould
not have occurred) (Heckman, 2008; Morgan and Winship, 2007; Pearl, 1995; Pearl, 2010; Pearl, 2000). Reverse
causality also constrains causal inference, as persons who develop ill health may experience reduced incomes, rather
than vice versa (Deaton, 2003; Smith, 1999). Randomised controlled trials are used to help answer questions of cau-
sality but are rare in social and economic policy, with pragmatic and ethical barriers often cited as reasons for not
conducting such trials. Importantly, however, the artiﬁcial setting of a trial may limit external validity as the contex-
tual factors may modify interventions in unanticipated ways (Petticrew et al., 2013). To overcome some of these lim-
itations, recent studies have focussed on exploiting ‘natural experiments’ (Angrist and Pischke, 2009; Craig et al.,
2012; Dunning, 2008; Dunning, 2012; Petticrew et al., 2005; Robinson et al., 2009; Sekhon and Titiunik, 2012;
Reeves et al., 2016) or speciﬁc exogenous changes in milieu that assign individuals to either the intervention or
the control groups through a process that is random or is ‘as-if random’, such as winning a lottery or naturally occur-
ring variation in the roll-out of policy interventions (Dunning, 2012; Morgan and Winship, 2007).
In 1999, the UK government introduced National Minimum Wage legislation, mandating a wage ﬂoor of
£3.60 per hour. Employers who did not pay minimum wages faced a £5000 ﬁne (Ipsos, 2012). For workers
earning below the threshold, the wage increase corresponded to an average 30% pay rise (Low Pay Commis-
sion, 2000). However, those people earning above the threshold were likely unaffected, and, as compliance was
imperfect, not all low-wage groups actually received higher wages. Thus, the UK National Minimum Wage in-
tervention creates a rare natural experiment to be exploited (Leigh, 2007; Neumark and Wascher, 2001; Stewart
and Swafﬁeld, 2002; Stewart, 2004b).
Although many studies have examined the economic effects of minimum wages, there is ongoing debate about
its net effects and potential unintended consequences. This debate concentrates on, in particular, whether wages
also rise for those above the minimum wage threshold, whether the numbers of hours worked decrease, and
whether minimum wages increase risks of job loss. Taking one example, US studies of minimum wages suggest
that they increased wages for those just above the minimum wage threshold, whereas in the UK, there is no ev-
idence of such spillovers, although the contextual factors that underlie such international differences are not well
understood (Dickens and Manning 2004a; Dickens and Manning 2004b; Neumark et al., 2004; Stewart, 2012).
To our knowledge, however, no study has investigated the health effects of the UK National Minimum
Wage. Several US studies have found that minimum wages corresponded to lower unmet medical need and
obesity rates (Kim and Leigh, 2010; McCarrier et al., 2011), and others have investigated effects of earned in-
come tax credits on smoking and low birth weight among recipients’ children, using natural experiment
methods (Averett and Wang, 2013; Hoynes et al., 2015). Building on these prior studies, we test whether in-
creases in wages among low-wage groups had a positive health effect, evaluating the natural policy experiment
created by the National Minimum Wage with longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey.
One plausible and potentially signiﬁcant mechanism by which increasing wages may yield health (as well as
potentially economic) beneﬁts is by reducing ﬁnancial strain. This occurs when people’s subjective assessment
of their ﬁnancial situation improves—which is one risk factor for poor mental health. Longitudinal evidence
from the UK and Australia ﬁnd that when people transition into unaffordable housing, they become more likely
to experience poorer mental health (Bentley et al., 2011; Bentley et al., 2015; Taylor et al., 2007). Similarly,
those who experienced ﬁnancial difﬁculties over an 18-month period became more likely to suffer from com-
mon mental health problems than those who did not experience ﬁnancial difﬁculties (Skapinakis et al., 2006).
Given this evidence, we would expect that those who receive the minimum wage will experience a greater
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reduction in ﬁnancial strain than those who do not and that this change in ﬁnancial strain will mediate the
association between the minimum wage and health.
Speciﬁcally, in this study, we test the hypothesis that increasing wages leads to signiﬁcant improvements in
mental health, or psychiatric ‘caseness’, by reducing ﬁnancial strain by comparing the effects of the wage increase
on those who receive it (intervention group) with those persons who did not receive a wage boost (control group).
2. METHODS
2.1. Data
The British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) is a nationally representative longitudinal survey of 5500 house-
holds and ~10 000 individuals, covering the years from 1991 to 2009; details of the survey have been described
elsewhere (Lynn et al., 2006). Brieﬂy, households were randomly selected from 250 primary sampling units
(postcode sectors) and subsequently stratiﬁed by socio-economic factors, oversampling impoverished groups
(Lynn et al., 2006). The same individuals were interviewed annually in successive ‘waves’ of the survey. Data
were drawn for the period just prior to the introduction in 1998 (pre-intervention, wave 8) and after in 1999
(post-intervention, wave 9), although we also consider the longer term trends for these groups between 1994
and 2001. Men and women who were under 22 were excluded, because the full rate National Minimum Wage
applied only to persons over that age. For those aged 18 to 21, there was a ‘special development rate’ set at
£3.00 per hour; however, we removed this sub-group (n=28) because the impact is likely to differ from that
in older persons (Low Pay Commission, 2000). Individuals aged 16–17 eventually became eligible for the min-
imum wage but not until 2004 and so are also excluded from the analysis here. Persons over age 59 were ex-
cluded because many would have become eligible for pensions. Additionally, persons who were not working at
least 1 h per week in both 1998 and 1999 were excluded to separate the effects of wage increases from those of
ﬁnding employment. The National Minimum Wage came into effect in April 1999; data collection for the
BHPS in the wave prior to this began in September of 1998, and by the end of January 1999, 99% of the sample
had been interviewed. This wave constitutes the before-intervention observation. Thus, wave 9, which began in
September 1999, constitutes the ﬁrst post-intervention observation (Morgan and Winship, 2007). While there
was attrition in the full sample, there was zero attrition in either the treatment or control groups between 1998
and 1999 among those who participated in the survey in 1998 (i.e. the analytic sample) (Noah Uhrig, 2008).
2.2. Health outcomes
Based on previous literature, we are primarily interested in examining the impact of the introduction of the min-
imum wage on mental health outcomes. The probability of having a mental health problem was assessed using
the General Health Questionnaire (GHQ), which we have treated as a continuous variable. The GHQ is a reli-
able mental health scale, robust to retest effects, and a good predictor of psychological problems, including de-
pression (Argyle, 1987; Goldberg et al., 1997; Goldberg, 1978; McCabe et al., 1996; Pevalin, 2000). Although
it comes in variants with different numbers of items, the BHPS used the 12-item version. To facilitate interpre-
tation, the indicator was positively coded so that high scores correspond to reduced likelihood of a mental
health problem (improved mental health) (refer to Box 1). Although the GHQ is now used mainly to
dichotomise individuals into cases or non-cases of mental distress or disorder, an early evaluation of the prop-
erties of the 30, 28, and 12-item variants found ‘support for the treatment of GHQ scores as a continuous var-
iable’ (Banks, 1983). Moreover, the cut-point used in contemporary studies varies considerably, as can be seen
from a selection of recent publications, each using a different cut-point (Adebowale and Adelufosi, 2013;
Bianchini et al., 2013; Clarke et al., 2013; Reang and Bhattacharjya, 2013), and other researchers do use the
score as a continuous variable (Theoﬁlou, 2011) (in some cases in addition to a dichotomised one) (Bertotti
et al., 2013) or have created a continuous scale from a sub-set of questions (Risberg and Jacobsen, 2003).
We also examined two speciﬁc components of the GHQ-12 pertinent to the policy intervention, including
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whether the respondents have felt ‘constantly under strain’ or ‘unhappy or depressed’, as well as a BHPS mea-
sure of self-reported depression.
In addition to mental health, we also examine the association between the introduction of the minimum wage
and changes in physical health and health behaviours. To assess physical health, we included BHPS questions
on whether respondents report chronic conditions, such as hearing difﬁculties. These measures are used as so-
called falsiﬁcation tests because the introduction of the minimum wage would not plausibly change these health
outcomes, at least not in the short term. We also examine other health measures that might be sensitive to short-
term ﬂuctuations in income: (1) self-reported diagnosis of elevated blood pressure, which may be responsive to
short-term ﬂuctuations in stress, and (2) the number of cigarettes smoked per day among current smokers,
which may increase if the minimum wage increases disposable income or may decrease if smoking is consid-
ered an ‘inferior good’ (Blanchﬂower and Oswald, 2008; Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).
Box 1: Description of health outcomes and ﬁnancial difﬁculties
GHQ: GHQ caseness scale is a 13-point version of the GHQ scale capturing general mental health from a
battery of 12 questions (1—worst to 13—best).
Constantly under strain: Have you recently felt constantly under strain? Not at all or no more than usual = 0,
rather more or much more = 1.
Anxiety/depression: Do you have any of the health problems or disabilities listed on this card? No=0, yes = 1.
Unhappy or depressed: Have you recently been feeling unhappy or depressed? Not at all or no more than
usual = 0, rather more or much more =1.
Hearing problems: Do you have any of the health problems or disabilities listed on this card? No=0, yes =1.
Blood pressure: Do you have any of the health problems or disabilities listed on this card? Heart/blood
pressure or blood circulation problems. No=0, yes = 1.
Number of cigarettes: Approximately how many cigarettes a day do you usually smoke, including those you
roll yourself?
Current ﬁnancial hardship: How well would you say you yourself are managing ﬁnancially these days?
Would you say you are....? 1=Living comfortably, 2 =doing alright, 3 = just about getting by, 4 =ﬁnding
it difﬁcult, 5 =ﬁnding it very difﬁcult.
2.3. Random intervention assignment pattern
The intervention group comprises those who earned less than £3.60 per hour in 1998 and who then earned be-
tween £3.60 and £4.00 per hour in 1999. We compared health changes in people who received a wage increase
(intervention group, n=63) to those who did not because either (1) they were ineligible as their hourly wage
was between 100 and 110% of the minimum wage, at £3.60 to £4.00 per hour (control group 1, n=107),
and (2) they were eligible but their ﬁrms did not comply, that is, their wages remained below the national min-
imum (control group 2, n=109). We select the intervention group based on post-intervention wages because we
assume that any increase in earnings above 110% of the minimum wage is likely to be because of reasons other
than the intervention (such as a job promotion or transition). This approach differs from previous intention-
to-treat analyses that examine the impact on the policy change on those who were earning less than £3.60 per hour
at baseline. This restriction, especially for control group 2, may create some selection bias, because psychologi-
cally fragile people may be more likely to be exploited by their ﬁrms and so not receive the National Minimum
Wage. We expect this bias to be relatively small because the decision to introduce the minimum wage is made at
the ﬁrm level and not at the individual level; nonetheless, as a robustness check, we test this possibility.
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Wages were measured as self-reported gross monthly income from the respondent’s main job, divided by the
number of hours worked in their main job, including overtime, to calculate hourly wages. In about one third of
cases, self-reported income was matched to payslips, providing further validation of earnings (Jenkins, 2010).
Assignment to the intervention or control group can be considered as-if random if members of both groups are
comparable on other covariates (such as age). We use a series of statistical tests to examine this as-if random
assignment procedure (refer to Box 2 and Table I). These tests cannot prove that the assignment pattern is
as-if random, but the results are consistent with that assumption.
Box 2: Pre-intervention comparisons
If it is to identify causal effects, the natural policy experiment should simulate a randomised trial, so that all
differences between the intervention and control groups apart from the wage increase are random. We argue
this minimumwage natural policy experiment approximates a randomised trial, and therefore, we test whether
the as-if random aspect of this natural experiment is violated. Often, this occurs when subjects can self-select
into the intervention group. While in theory it is possible that persons above the income threshold could
choose to move into a lower income group, this is very unlikely. Another possibility is that persons in the
non-compliance control group had differing working environments that may have resulted in prior health
differences, but we found no signiﬁcant difference in a range of such measures (Table 1). While it has been
argued that the National Minimum Wage may have increased the latter group’s risk of unemployment or
led to wage reductions, neither has been observed (Stewart 2004b).We further tested whether the intervention
and two control groups differed with respect to age, education, and other socio-demographic factors prior to
the introduction of the National Minimum Wage. None of the pre-intervention covariates signiﬁcantly differ
at α=0.05 in the non-compliance sample. In the preceding and succeeding sample, we ﬁnd that those earn-
ing more than £3.60 per hour in 1998 were more likely to be in the service class, less likely to be satisﬁed
with their job, and had higher incomes than those earning less than £3.60 per hour.
2.4. Statistical model
Box 3: Difference-in-difference modelling framework
This modelling framework estimates differences in the health outcomes between 1998 and 1999 for both the
intervention group and the control group. Thus, to estimate the health change in the intervention group, we
sequentially estimate the ‘intervention effect on those receiving a wage increase’,
ΔHwageincrease ¼ αþ βwageincreaseNational Minimum Wage þ ε; (3:1)
and the ‘intervention effect on the control group’,
ΔHcontrol ¼ αþ βcontrolNon recipients of National Minimum Wage þ ε (3:2)
Changes in this latter group reﬂect common background trends, such as those arising from contemporary
changes in the labour market and macroeconomic circumstances. Thus, the intervention effect is the differ-
ence between these two observed effects, yielding the main difference-in-difference estimator (Angrist and
Pischke 2009)
Intervention effect ¼ βwageincrease–βcontrol (3:3)
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To evaluate the average intervention effect, we assessed the difference-in-difference between the observed
within-individual changes in health outcomes (H) over time in the intervention group compared with those
in the control groups (refer to Box 3 for more details):
Intervention effect ¼ ΔHwageincrease  ΔHcontrol: (1)
To estimate the intervention effect, we used both differenced models and ﬁxed-effects regression models in-
cluding an interaction term between a period dummy and an intervention indicator. Both sets of models pro-
duced very similar results, in part because they both adjust for individual-speciﬁc differences that are
constant over time. Using regression models, we further adjusted models for age, sex, social class (measured
with the National Statistics Socio-Economic Classiﬁcation, a commonly used measure of occupation stratiﬁca-
tion), and education, which were not plausibly affected by the intervention (King et al., 2000). To test whether
the pathway between the minimum wage and mental health problems (measured by GHQ-12 as ‘psychiatric
caseness’) is inﬂuenced by ﬁnancial strain, we further examine whether receiving the wage increase because
of the minimum wage legislation affects current ﬁnancial strain (Taylor et al., 2011) (‘How well… are [you]
managing ﬁnancially these days?’) and whether the effect of the minimum wage on health is attenuated when
this measure of ﬁnancial strain is included in the difference-in-difference model. Additionally, we assess
whether the observed effects were sustained in time periods after the initial year of intervention. We also com-
pare the estimated effect sizes observed using the natural experimental approach with identiﬁcation based on
traditional multivariable regression models. All models were analysed in STATA v12.1.
3. RESULTS
3.1. Health effects of the National Minimum Wage
Figure 1 depicts the observed differences in means in the intervention group and both control groups. In 1998,
prior to the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, the recipients and control group had similar psychi-
atric caseness scores in the GHQ, physical health, and consumption of alcohol and tobacco (Table I). As shown
in the ﬁgure, after the introduction of the National Minimum Wage, recipients of the wage increase report sig-
niﬁcantly improved psychiatric caseness while eligible non-recipients did not.
The difference-in-differences in total GHQ scores were statistically signiﬁcant (ΔGHQ score 0.93,
p=0.025). This improvement represents approximately 0.373 of a standard deviation, comparable in magni-
tude to the effect size estimated for antidepressants (0.39 of a standard deviation) on depressive symptoms
(Moncrieff et al., 2004). Similarly, among the intervention group, there were lower probabilities of unhappi-
ness or depression (0.14, p=0.045), being constantly under strain (0.098, p=0.013), and anxiety or depres-
sion (0.10, p=0.016). There was no difference between the intervention group and control group 1 (eligible
non-recipients) in terms of the change in the likelihood of hearing problems (p=0.64), experiencing elevate
blood pressure (p=0.58), and the number of cigarettes smoked (p=0.26) (Table II and Figure 2).
Similar results were observed using the second control group—ineligible non-recipients (control group 2)
(Web Appendix 1). Following the introduction of the minimum wage, the intervention group had signiﬁcantly
greater improvements in their psychiatric caseness than the control group (ΔGHQ=1.06, p=0.021) (refer to
Table III). Similarly, among the intervention group, the probability of reporting depressive symptoms declined
(0.15, p=0.043), whereas there was no statistically signiﬁcant change in either the likelihood of experiencing
hearing problems (p=0.33), being diagnosed with elevated blood pressure (p=0.063), or change in the number
of cigarettes respondents consumed (p=0.32).
To account for potential unobserved confounding, we regress change in GHQ on a dummy for the interven-
tion group (=1) and a series of potential socio-demographic differences, including age, sex, tenure, social class,
education and marital status age, gender, and education. As shown in Table IV panel A (control group 1) and
panel B (control group 2), the estimated effect of the wage increase on recipients remains statistically
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Table I. As-if randomisation tests for intervention and control groups, prior to the introduction of the National Minimum
Wage, 1998
Intervention
group (n = 63) Control group 1 (n = 107) Control group 2 (n = 109)
Mean (std. dev.) Mean (std. dev.)
Intervention
control
(std. error) p value Mean (std. dev.)
Intervention
control
(std. error) p value
Socio-demographic
Sex (female = 1) 0.87 (0.34) 0.76 (0.42) 0.097 (0.059) 0.099 0.85 (0.36) 0.020 (0.054) 0.72
Age 39.24 (11.32) 38.23 (11.90) 1.00 (1.83) 0.58 39.61 (10.80) 0.38 (1.76) 0.83
Labour income
(£ per month)
398.00 (222.66) 613.98 (285.27) 215.98** (39.34) <0.001 330.28 (205.99) 67.72 (34.30) 0.051
Hourly wage
(£ per hour)
3.00 (0.49) 3.80 (0.11) 0.79** (0.06) <0.001 2.85 (0.65) 0.16 (0.046) 0.08
Post-secondary
education = 1a
0.36 (0.48) 0.49 (0.50) 0.14 (0.093) 0.15 0.38 (0.49) 0.032 (0.091) 0.73
Married = 1 0.57 (0.49) 0.60 (0.49) 0.027 (0.079) 0.74 0.60 (0.49) 0.024 (0.079) 0.75
Pre-intervention health
status
General Health
Questionnaire
11.05 (3.06) 11.36 (2.53) 0.32 (0.46) 0.49 11.33 (2.98) 0.28 (0.48) 0.56
Smokinga 17.00 (6.12) 14.95 (6.79) 2.05 (1.50) 0.18 17.76 (9.33) 0.76 (1.67) 0.65
Financial strain 0.095 (0.30) 0.037 (0.19) 0.058 (0.042) 0.18 0.046 (0.21) 0.049 (0.042) 0.25
Blood pressure 0.11 (0.32) 0.056 (0.23) 0.055 (0.046) 0.23 0.11 (0.31) 0.0010 (0.050) 0.98
Hearing problems 0.048 (0.21) 0.037 (0.19) 0.010 (0.033) 0.76 0.037 (0.19) 0.011 (0.032) 0.74
Depression 0.25 (0.44) 0.25 (0.44) 0.0016 (0.070) 0.98 0.23 (0.42) 0.025 (0.069) 0.72
Anxiety/depression 0.079 (0.27) 0.056 (0.23) 0.023 (0.041) 0.57 0.083 (0.28) 0.0032 (0.043) 0.94
Housing status
Owned home
outright = 1
0.14 (0.35) 0.12 (0.33) 0.021 (0.054) 0.70 0.17 (0.38) 0.031 (0.058) 0.59
Mortgage = 1 0.44 (0.50) 0.50 (0.50) 0.060 (0.079) 0.45 0.36 (0.48) 0.087 (0.078) 0.27
Social renters = 1 0.35 (0.48) 0.26 (0.44) 0.088 (0.074) 0.24 0.29 (0.46) 0.056 (0.075) 0.46
Private renters = 1 0.048 (0.21) 0.093 (0.29) 0.046 (0.039) 0.24 0.11 (0.31) 0.062 (0.040) 0.12
Joint F-test for housing
status
0.72 0.65
Employment
Job hours 26.41 (13.55) 29.67 (11.95) 3.46 (2.06) 0.096 24.65 (14.11) 1.76 (2.18) 0.42
Financial situation:
‘getting by’ = 1
0.29 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) 0.022 (0.073) 0.76 0.24 (0.43) 0.047 (0.071) 0.50
Job satisfaction 5.83 (1.16) 5.38 (1.29) 0.44* (0.19) 0.023 5.63 (1.29) 0.19 (0.19) 0.32
Full-time
employment = 1
0.51 (0.50) 0.33 (0.48) 0.17 (0.095) 0.07 1.61 (0.49) 0.10 (0.08) 0.19
Social class: service = 1 0.016 (0.13) 0.11 (0.32) 0.096** (0.035) 0.0060 0.064 (0.25) 0.048 (0.028) 0.091
Social class: routine
non-manual = 1
0.37 (0.49) 0.33 (0.47) 0.038 (0.076) 0.62 0.36 (0.48) 0.0073 (0.077) 0.92
Social class: routine
manual = 1
0.38 (0.49) 0.47 (0.50) 0.086 (0.078) 0.27 0.53 (0.50) 0.15 (0.079) 0.055
Joint F-test for social
class
0.42 0.19
p value is calculated using two-tailed t-test assuming unequal variances. Hourly incomes are all below £4.00 per hour. Higher GHQ score
captures better health (1 = worst, 13 = best).
aRestricted sample size in control group 1. Smoking: intervention n = 35, control n = 42. Post-secondary education: intervention n = 42, con-
trol n = 88. Full-time employment: intervention n = 63, control n = 45. Restricted sample size in control group 2. Smoking: intervention
n = 35, control n = 51. Post-secondary education: intervention n = 42, control n = 90. Full-time employment: intervention n = 63, control
n = 108.
*p< 0.05.
**p< 0.01.
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signiﬁcant, reﬂecting a divergence in depressive symptoms between those who receive the wage increase and
those who do not.
3.2. Potential role of ﬁnancial strain
First, we tested whether receiving the minimum wage was associated with lower levels of current ﬁnancial
strain between 1998 and 1999. We found that the intervention group experiences less ﬁnancial strain than
both control group 1, eligible non-recipients (β = 0.29; p= 0.034), and control group 2, ineligible non-
recipients (β= 0.35; p=0.008) (Table V). By regressing change in GHQ on change in an individual’s cur-
rent ﬁnancial situation, we found that improvement in respondents’ ﬁnancial circumstances was associated
with better psychiatric caseness score in both control groups 1 (β = 0.76; p= 0.012) and 2 (β =1.13;
p= 0.0014).
Next, we tested whether ﬁnancial strain mediated the effect of the minimum wage on mental health, or psy-
chiatric caseness, by regressing change in GHQ on minimum wage indicator and changes in ﬁnancial strain.
We observed that adjusting for ﬁnancial strain attenuated the effect of receiving the National Minimum Wage
in both control groups 1 (p=0.11) and 2 (p=0.18) (Table VI).
We assessed whether the positive mental health effects were sustained after the initial year of wage
increase by adding a subsequent year, 2000/2001. We observed that between 1999/2000 and 2000/2001,
there was no signiﬁcant change in the mean GHQ score in the intervention group, indicating that the im-
provement persisted. In parallel, mean GHQ scores did not signiﬁcantly change in either control group in this
same period.
Figure 1. Observed differences in mean General Health Questionnaire scores between intervention and control groups, 1996–2001
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3.3. Robustness tests
First, we compared estimates from the natural experiment to those from multivariable regression models (refer
to Web Appendix 2). Web Appendix 2 reports a series of regression models, where each coefﬁcient in each cell
is from a separate model and each row is a different outcome variable. We estimate a series of random-effects
linear regression models (controlling for time dummies) that include observations from 1994 to 2001 (before
Table II. Difference-in-differences estimate of the health effects of the National Minimum Wage, control group 1,
1998–1999
Equation 2: intervention
effect on those receiving
a wage increase (std. dev.)
Equation 3: intervention
effect on those not receiving
a wage increase (std. dev.)
Equation 4: difference in
means: intervention-control
(standard error) p value
n = 63 n = 107 n = 170
Change in mental health
GHQ score (1998–1999) 0.70 (2.95) 0.23 (2.97) 0.93b (0.47) 0.025
‘More unhappiness or
depression’a
0.13 (0.52) 0.0093 (0.47) 0.14b (0.080) 0.045
‘Constantly under strain’a 0.079 (0.27) 0.019 (0.27) 0.098b (0.043) 0.013
Self-report anxiety/depressiona 0.063 (0.30) 0.037 (0.28) 0.10b (0.047) 0.016
Change in health behaviours
Number of cigarettesa,b 0.52 (5.11) 0.19 (4.06) 0.70 (1.11) 0.26
Change in physical health
problems
Self-report hearing problemsa 0.016 (0.13) 0.0093 (0.097) 0.0065 (0.018) 0.64
Blood pressure 0.016 (0.22) 0.0093 (0.22) 0.0065 (0.035) 0.58
One-tailed t-test reported for difference between mean differences, based on unequal variances. Higher GHQ score captures better health
(1 = worst, 13 = best).
aBox 1 describes variable coding.
bn = 73, because of non-response and constraining sample to those who are smokers.
Figure 2. The estimated effect of the National Minimum Wage on health outcomes, control group 1, 1998–1999
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and after the intervention in 1999) in order to estimate the health effects of a £1 increase in hourly wages across
this period. To capture any non-linearity in the income-health association, we use a sample of low-wage
workers (<£10), divided into those below the median (column 1= those earning below £6 per hour in the pre-
vious year (n=4478)) and those above the median in this sub-sample (column 2= earning between £6 and £10
per hour in the previous year (n=4411)). We estimated that each £1 increase in wage was associated with
Table III. Difference-in-differences estimate of the health effects of the National Minimum Wage, control group 2,
1998–1999
Equation 2: intervention
effect on those receiving
a wage increase (std. dev.)
Equation 3: intervention
effect on those not receiving
a wage increase (std. dev.)
Equation 4: difference in
means: intervention-control
(standard error) p value
n = 63 n = 109 n = 172
Change in mental health
GHQ score (1998–1999) 0.70 (2.95) 0.36 (3.75) 1.06b (0.52) 0.021
‘More unhappiness or
depression’a
0.13 (0.52) 0.018 (0.54) 0.15b (0.084) 0.043
‘Constantly under strain’a 0.079 (0.27) 0.018 (0.30) 0.098b (0.045) 0.016
Self-report anxiety/depressiona 0.063 (0.30) 0.00 (0.30) 0.063 (0.048) 0.095
Change in health behaviours
Number of cigarettesa,b 0.52 (5.11) 0.00 (4.18) 0.52 (1.09) 0.32
Change in physical health
problems
Self-report hearing problemsa 0.016 (0.13) 0.028 (0.21) 0.012 (0.026) 0.33
Blood pressure 0.016 (0.22) 0.073 (0.26) 0.057 (0.037) 0.063
One-tailed t-test reported for difference between mean differences, based on unequal variances. Higher GHQ score captures better health
(1 = worst, 13 = best).
aBox 1 describes variable coding.
bn = 73, because of non-response and constraining sample to those who are smokers.
Table IV. Association between receiving the minimum wage and health in control group 1 (A) and control group 2 (B),
1998–1999, adjusted for socio-demographic controls
ΔGHQ score between 1998 and 1999
A. Control group 1 (1) (2)
Intervention effect on those receiving a wage increase, NMW (yes = 1) 0.93* (0.47) 1.04* (0.49)
Adjusted for covariates N Y
Number of observations 170 166
R2 0.023 0.15
ΔGHQ score between 1998 and 1999
B. Control group 2 (1) (2)
Intervention effect on those receiving a wage increase, NMW (yes = 1) 1.06* (0.52) 1.59** (0.54)
Adjusted for covariates N Y
Number of observations 172 170
R2 0.021 0.15
Control group 1: comparison of the eligible recipients and ineligible non-recipients. Control group 2: comparison of the eligible recipients
and eligible non-recipients. Higher GHQ score captures better health (1 =worst, 13 = best). Observations combined from both 1998 and
1999 hence larger number of observations. Control variables include age, tenure, number of hours worked, occupational class (NS-
SEC), education, and marital status.
*p< 0.05, two-tailed test.
**p< 0.01, two-tailed test.
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signiﬁcant increases in GHQ scores of 0.038 (p=0.043) and lower probabilities of depression (0.011,
p<0.001) for those on low wages, that is, <£6 per hour (Web Appendix 2). In contrast, there was no clear as-
sociation between increasing wages and the change in GHQ score among persons whose earnings were above
the median in the low-wage sub-sample (ΔGHQ score 0.0072, p=0.65).
Control group 1 was deﬁned as those who earn between 100 and 110% of the minimum wage. To test
whether restricting the post-intervention wages for the treatment group inﬂuences our results, we increase
the upper limit incrementally by 10 pence (£0.10) in a series of models (Web Appendix 3). The original
difference-in-difference estimate is 1.01 (p=0.037). If the control group includes those who earn up to
£4.10, then the difference-in-difference estimate is 1.17 (p=0.013). If the control group includes those who
earn up to £4.20, then the difference-in-difference estimate is 0.93 (p=0.044). If the control group includes
Table V. Association between changes in ﬁnancial strain and receiving the minimum wage in control group 1 and control
group 2, 1998–1999
Covariates
ΔFinancial strain score between 1998 and 1999
Intervention and control group 1 Intervention and control group 2
(1) (2)
Intervention effect on those receiving a wage increase,
NMW (yes = 1)
0.29*
(0.13)
0.35**
(0.13)
Number of observations 170 172
R2 0.025 0.040
Constant estimated in the model (not shown). Control group 1: comparison of the eligible recipients and ineligible non-recipients. Control
group 2: comparison of the eligible recipients and eligible non-recipients. Higher ﬁnancial scores capture greater ﬁnancial security (1 = ﬁnd-
ing it very difﬁcult, 5 = living comfortably). Box 1 deﬁnes ﬁnancial strain.
*p< 0.05, two-tailed test.
**p< 0.01, two-tailed test.
Table VI. Mediating effect of ﬁnancial strain on the minimum wage-health association in control group 1 (A) and control
group 2 (B), 1998–1999
ΔGHQ score between 1998 and 1999
A. Control group 1 (1) (2)
Intervention effect on those receiving a wage
increase, NMW (yes = 1)
0.93*
(0.47)
0.73
(0.46)
Change in ﬁnancial strain — 0.69*
(0.30)
Number of observations 170 170
R2 0.023 0.062
ΔGHQ score between 1998 and 1999
B. Control group 2 (1) (2)
Intervention effect on those receiving a wage
increase, NMW (yes = 1)
1.06*
(0.52)
0.69
(0.51)
Change in ﬁnancial strain — 1.06**
(0.36)
Number of observations 172 172
R2 0.021 0.083
Constant estimated in the model (not shown). Control group 1: comparison of the eligible recipients and ineligible non-recipients. Control
group 2: comparison of the eligible recipients and eligible non-recipients. Higher GHQ score captures better health (1 = worst, 13 = best).
Higher ﬁnancial scores captures greater ﬁnancial security (1 = ﬁnding it very difﬁcult, 5 = living comfortably). Box 1 deﬁnes ﬁnancial strain.
*p< 0.05, two-tailed test.
**p< 0.01, two-tailed test.
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those who earn up to £4.30, then the difference-in-difference estimate is 0.83 (p=0.064). And ﬁnally, if the
control group includes those who earn up to £4.40, then the difference-in-difference estimate is 0.81
(p=0.07). The effect is clearly attenuated slightly as earnings increase, but the magnitude of the effect on men-
tal health is large and is close to being signiﬁcant, even at ~20% above the minimum wage threshold.
One possible source of confounding is from second jobs; however, in the analytic sample, the numbers
reporting multiple jobs were small (<5% of the sample). None received the minimum wage. Hence, when ex-
cluding this sub-set with second jobs, our results were unchanged (Web Appendix 4). Another source of con-
founding concerns those who might be earning below the minimum wage because of an exemption, such as
those who receive accommodation from their employer. We remove these individuals (n=7) from our models
to test whether they inﬂuence our results and ﬁnd that they do not (ΔGHQ=1.05, p=0.050). Additionally, we
assessed job satisfaction over time to test whether differences between employers are likely to explain the psy-
chological beneﬁts we observe for the intervention group. We ﬁnd that the intervention group experienced
greater but non-signiﬁcant declines in job satisfaction between 1998 and 1999 (difference-in-difference = 0.066,
p=0.81, n=172) (Web Appendix 5). This is somewhat unexpected given that increased wages can lead to
greater job satisfaction (Lydon and Chevalier, 2002). However, this wage increase is a response to a
government-mandated policy and not a reﬂection of managerial generosity, so the inﬂuence of an increase in
wages on job satisfaction may vary depending on the source of the increase, e.g. employer or government.
Selecting the intervention group based on post-intervention wages may generate bias if those who remain below
the minimumwage are more susceptible to worsening mental health. This is especially relevant to control group 2,
including persons whom were eligible but did not receive the wage uplift. To test this possibility, we re-estimate
the difference-in-difference models of changes in GHQ on membership in each control group between 1998 and
1999. If selection effects were substantial, it would mean that control groups 1 and 2 did not have parallel
trajectories; however, we did not detect this pattern (difference-in-difference estimate between control group 1 and
control group 2=0.026, p=0.88). In fact, control group 1 and control group 2 are similar in terms of their GHQ scores
before the intervention (p=0.74), with no statistically discernable difference between them over time (p=0.41).
Consistent with prior research, we found no effect of the introduction of the minimum wage on the likeli-
hood of employment for either intervention or control groups between 1998 and 1999 (Web Appendix 6).
To reduce the positive skew in GHQ-12, we re-estimate our models using the natural log of the dependent var-
iable, ﬁnding that our results do not qualitatively change (p=0.018). Comparing the intervention group with all
other people in the sample over the age of 21, we ﬁnd that the effect is attenuated slightly but remains largely
distinct (ΔGHQ score 0.67, p=0.089, n=8585). Currently in this paper, we assume that, on average over the
month, overtime payments are similar to the contracted hourly wage, and so, the overtime premium is relatively
small. Yet, this is almost certainly an underestimate. As a robustness check, we now calculate an overtime pre-
mium of 25, 50, and 75%. We report our difference-in-differences for both control groups—showing that none
of the results was changed with this adjustment (refer to Web Appendix 7). Combining both control groups
(control group n=216; intervention group n=63), we observe that the introduction of the minimum wage im-
proved mental health among the intervention group over and above any change in the combined control group
(ΔGHQ score for intervention group: 0.99, p=0.023). Following Stewart (2004a), we re-estimate our models
using a wage gap estimator (refer to equation 2 on page 72) that captures the change in income because of the min-
imum wage using the gap between the minimumwage threshold in 1999 (£3.60) and actual wage in 1998. For ex-
ample, if person A earned £3.20 per hour in 1998, then the wage gap would be 0.40, while for person B—who is in
the control group—the wage gap would be 0. Using this approach, we ﬁnd that our results are attenuated slightly
but are of similar magnitude to our previous estimates and are in the same direction (Web Appendix 8).
Finally, our approach to deﬁning the intervention group in this paper differs from previous research because
we condition on post-intervention wages. To relax this assumption, we keep the same control groups but re-
estimate our models by including all those individuals who were earning less than £3.60 in 1998 and then were
earning more than £3.60 per hour in 1999. Again, the results are in the same direction, albeit attenuated (Web
Appendix 9). This likely reﬂects that wage increases this large are not because of minimum wage but other fac-
tors unrelated to the policy. For example, if we compare this new intervention group with the control group 2,
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in contrast to the main results, we now ﬁnd that the intervention group are more likely to be male, are younger,
earn more money, work more hours, and less likely to have a full-time job than the control group.
4. DISCUSSION
Our study uses a natural experiment design to approximate an ‘as-if random’ controlled trial of wage in-
creases in milieu among low-paid workers. Using two control groups that fulﬁl as-if randomisation criteria
prior to the intervention, we were able to identify important differences in groups exposed to wage rises be-
cause of the National Minimum Wage intervention. This approach advances existing scholarship by address-
ing some of Bradford-Hill’s criteria for a causal relationship that was previously missing from the literature,
including speciﬁcity (low-wage workers), strength of association (comparable with the effect of antidepres-
sants), plausibility, consistency, temporal relationship (divergence follows policy intervention), and, par-
tially, experimental evidence (Bradford-Hill, 1965). The authors of earlier reviews of the health effects of
increases in wages, which included income maintenance experiments, ﬁnancial aid to ex-prisoners, and lot-
tery winners, noted how opportunities to evaluate the effects of natural experiments had often been missed
(Connor et al., 1999).
By adding to this sparse literature, this study makes three main contributions to knowledge. First, the intro-
duction of a National Minimum Wage improved reported mental health among low-paid people, reducing their
probability of anxiety and depression. Second, it shows that these health beneﬁts are mediated, at least in part,
through changes in the ﬁnancial strain that low-paid people experience, with effects that are sustained over
time. Third, while it has been argued that wage rises in low-wage workers may be deleterious for health if ad-
ditional funds are used to consume tobacco, we found no such evidence of increased tobacco use. Consistent
with previous work that observes that tobacco is an inferior good, we observed a slightly negative albeit not
statistically signiﬁcant relationship (p> 0.05) between increased wages and tobacco in this UK minimum wage
experiment (Chaloupka and Warner, 2000).
Notwithstanding the strength of the study methodology, our analysis has several limitations. First, like many
natural experiments, the study’s sample size is small because, even with the large sample in the BHPS, the intro-
duction of the National Minimum Wage only inﬂuenced the lives of a minority of the employed (Dickens and
Manning 2004a; Dickens and Manning 2004b). Despite this smaller sample, which would weaken the study’s sta-
tistical power, the analysis was able to detect strong, statistically signiﬁcant effects of the National Minimum
Wage. The observed change of over one point on the 12-point scale (0.3 of a standard deviation) is comparable
with the effect of antidepressants on depression and is not trivial (Moncrieff et al., 2004). By more precisely iso-
lating intervention effects, the natural experimental design was able to identify a larger effect size, overcoming
problems associated with traditional regression-based estimates, despite having fewer observations.
Second, unlike with RCTs, it was not possible to eliminate all sources of potential selection bias between
intervention and control groups. For example, it is not possible to identify all of those persons who might be
exempt from the minimum wage, such as those who are receiving a training rate or whose wage is reduced be-
cause they receive accommodation from their employer. Nevertheless, because these groups likely form a very
small number of people in our sample, they are unlikely to substantial inﬂuence our results, although more re-
search will be needed to examine how the minimum wage may have inﬂuenced these groups. Further, prior to
the wage intervention, both study and control groups were statistically similar with respect to socio-
demographic factors and the health outcomes of interest. Particularly in the non-compliance control group,
there may have been unobserved employer characteristics that led mental health to deteriorate. However, there
was no pre-intervention difference in job satisfaction between control and intervention group on workplace
characteristics. Further, our study also found signiﬁcant improvements in mental health among the intervention
group but no signiﬁcant change among the control groups. The study also had a high degree of speciﬁcity, ob-
serving no signiﬁcant effect on physical outcomes such as hearing loss that would not plausibly change in a
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short period of time, given the absence of a plausible biological mechanism. Taken together, these ﬁndings
strongly indicate that the association is not because of an unobserved selection bias among the control groups.
Third, the measures of physical health are self-reported and therefore may under-report any change in prev-
alence of elevated blood pressure because of a change in ﬁnancial circumstances. Null effects should be
interpreted with some caution for this indicator. Fourth, introducing a minimum wage may also increase wages
for those who are already just above the minimum wage threshold, and so, those who are untreated could also
be inﬂuenced by the intervention (Morgan and Winship, 2007). While such spillover effects are theoretically
plausible, and this appears to have occurred in the USA, previous studies suggest that they did not inﬂuence
the UK’s wage distribution (Dickens and Manning 2004a; Dickens and Manning 2004b; Stewart, 2012). Fifth,
while there was no attrition in our analytic sample during the study period, there may have been attrition among
these groups before 1998. However, because attrition rates are so low in the BHPS, it is unlikely that this would
have substantially inﬂuenced our results. Finally, the study ﬁndings were consistent even after adjusting for a
range of potentially confounding socio-demographic factors and workplace characteristics such as job satisfac-
tion. Hence, unobserved confounding in the non-compliance sample is unlikely to account for the study’s ﬁnd-
ings, adding support to the study’s ability to draw causal inference.
Importantly, the study suggests that increasing wages does not lead to unintended adverse outcomes among
persons who did not receive wage increases and further identiﬁed that ﬁnancial strain was an important factor
inﬂuencing the relationship between wage interventions and depressive symptoms. These ﬁndings are also con-
sistent with recent randomised controlled trials indicating that conditions of poverty increase psychological
pressure, which can impede decision-making and resultant welfare outcomes (Mani et al., 2013). Additionally,
while it is possible that persons who receive wage increase experience only short-term beneﬁts, subsequently
regressing to previous levels of welfare, we found that the reduction in depressive symptoms was sustained
at least up to 18–22 months after intervention. Future research is needed to investigate the longer term effects
of wage increases on the health and well-being of low-wage groups.
Further research is also needed to evaluate the health effects of alternative mechanisms of income interven-
tion, such as the UK’s earned income tax credits, as well as to understand the effects of larger income gains
among low-paid workers, currently being debated in the USA and UK. Overall, our results indicate that increas-
ing wages is likely to improve mental health, for example, by reducing depression and by alleviating ﬁnancial
strain among low-paid workers.
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